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The identification of individuals
Some thoughts on the ECHR judgment in the case N.D. and N.T.
 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in its judgment in the case and N.T. v.
Spain found that push-backs to Morocco in the border zone of the Spanish enclave
Melilla violated the prohibition of collective expulsion. The decision is important as it
concerns the delimitation between legitimate border protection and practices that
violate the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) – and thereby the key question
in all regulation of migration: how to fairly balance interests of state sovereignty and the
rights of migrants as protected in human rights treaties. The interpretation of respective
human rights norms and of the conditions under which they bind a particular state
participates beyond the concrete case in a debate across courts and across jurisdictions
about just criteria for balancing both sides.
Nothing in the argumentation of the court comes as a complete surprise: the court
affirms its understanding of the extra-territorial applicability of the ECHR, and
consolidates in a convincing way its jurisprudence on the prohibition of collective
expulsion under Article 4 of the 4  Additional Protocol (AP). What is remarkable is what
the court does not elaborate on: Spain’s contention that an official border post was
available for filing asylum claims and that this should be taken into account when
assessing the expulsions. Noteworthy are moreover the conditions for such scenario to
even get before the court: the commitment of non-governmental organizations and the
conditions of strategic litigation. These aspects are vaguely visible in the judgment
through the question of victim status.
Overall, the judgment has the potential of becoming an important reference point in the
European and the international legal debate about migration control. First we will have to
wait whether Spain requests a referral to the Grand Chamber, which would certainly have
high chances of being accepted. 
The facts of the case
The border zone between Morocco and the Spanish Melilla comprises three fences, two
with a height of six meters and one of three meters. In addition to barbed wire, the
fences have specific devices to hinder jumping down; moreover, infrared cameras and
motion detectors are installed to hinder unnoticed crossings. At this border the events of
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the case took place. On 13 August 2014, the later applicants, N.D. and N.T., tried crossing
into Melilla. N.D. is a Malian national, N.T. is a national of Côte d’Ivoire. The attempt of
scaling the barriers they undertook together with a group of more than 70 other
migrants; all of them were arrested by the Spanish Guardia Civil and returned to
Morocco immediately, without any procedure of identification. In Morocco, the migrants
were denied medical treatment, transported 300 kilometers into the country to Fez, and
left without any further assistance. That the case actually came before the ECtHR is due
to the fact that non-governmental organizations and journalists were present at the
scene, and videos were recorded on which N.D. and N.T. could be identified. 
Applicability of the Convention and victim status
In a first step, the court had to determine whether the ECHR was applicable, thus
whether the events fell under Spanish jurisdiction in sense of Article 1 ECHR. Two of the
three fences separating Morocco and Melilla are placed on Moroccan territory, one on
Spanish territory. N.D. had climbed the third fence before being returned, N.T. was seized
between the second and the third. But all this had no relevance, the court held, since
Spain in interdicting and returning the persons was exercising control, establishing
jurisdiction (para. 53, 54).
The court equally rejected Spain’s contention that the applicants lack the victim status
necessary for an application under Article 34. The Spanish government had argued that
the video recordings did not allow to unequivocally identify the two applicants, and even
if N.D. and N.T. had been among the persons returned that day, their later successful
attempt to enter Spain ended their victim status. The second point the court rejects in
one sentence: entering Spain at a later point does not affect the question whether rights
under the Convention were violated in that instance. Moreover, the court considered
credible that N.D. and N.T. were among the filmed persons on the recordings. That no
clearer documentation exists who was rejected that day is attributable to Spain (para. 60).
Violation of the prohibition of collective expulsion
The central question was whether Spain in its treatment of N.D. and N.T. violated the
prohibition of collective expulsion under Article 4 of Additional Protocol 4 to the ECHR.
As the court stresses, the objective of that rule is to prohibit states from expelling a
whole group of persons without taking note of individual circumstances and thereby
allowing each person to be heard with her arguments (para. 99). In the present case, an
expulsion clearly took place (para. 105); whether N.D. and N.T. were already on Spanish
territory is irrelevant for that matter since the prohibition of collective expulsions also
applies at the border, and to the denial to enter the territory (para. 104). This expulsion
was collective in nature since no identification of the individuals took place, left alone a
possibility to raise arguments. N.D. and N.T. were returned in a group of 75 to 80 persons,
individual circumstances did not play any role (para. 107).
Two points were raised by the parties that the ECtHR does not address – in a telling
silence: Spain argued that the prohibition of collective expulsion could not be violated
because the applicants tried to enter Spanish territory illegally, although official border
posts were available to apply for asylum (para. 74). No right exists, maintained the Spanish
government, to enter a state in any chosen way (para. 79). The applicants objected that no
possibility to apply for asylum existed, in particular not for persons from sub-Saharan
states. At the border post of Beni-Enzar, an office for international protection was
opened in the time after the events, in November 2014. As the Human Rights
Commissioner of the Council of Europe and by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees,
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intervening as third parties, also stressed, there was no possible way to claim asylum in
August 2014, and even later almost exclusively for Syrian refugees (para. 86). To note
apart from this case: such pre-classification along criteria of nationality runs counter to
the assessment of each individual case as the Geneva Refugee Convention foresees it.
This will remain a recurring theme in the attempts of the European Union to “classify”
migrants and asylum seekers already in North-African states, and it is important to re-
emphasize in that regard the principle of non-discrimination and the right to access an
individual procedure independently from one’s nationality.
What further underlies the contention regarding the border post is the purpose of the
prohibition of collective expulsion: does it (only) secure the principle of non-refoulement
by ensuring a possibility to be heard and potentially to apply for asylum, or is the purpose
of Article 4 AP 4 ECHR wider, protecting migrants regardless of their potential
qualification as refugees? This links to another line of argument the ECtHR does not even
enter into: considerations whether the notion of aliens in the prohibition of collective
expulsions can be read in an exclusionary manner. The applicants and intervening parties
had emphasized (para. 82, 90) that Article 4 AP 4 ECHR protects persons regardless of
their potential status as refugees. This is evident from the wording, and necessary also
with regard to refugee protection, since a decision about refugee status can only be
taken after the identification of individuals. In this case, the applicants were not accorded
refugee status in later proceedings; that this does not play any role for the assessment of
the events the court made clear by not even addressing the issue.
Beside the violation of the prohibition of collective expulsion, the court found a violation
of the right to an effective remedy under Article 13 ECHR.
“New challenges”
In its considerations, the ECtHR includes the phrase of the “new challenges”, which
European states face in immigration control because of the “economic crisis and recent
social and political changes” and their “particular impact on certain regions of Africa and
the Middle East” (para. 101). This formula the court previously employed in the case
Khlaifia (para. 241) and in the case Hirsi Jamaa (para. 176). Demonstrating that it is mindful
of states’ sovereignty concerns here serves the court as rhetorical buttress to
subsequently clarify that these concerns find their limits where they lead to a violation of
individual rights under the Convention. At the same time, the formula suggests the
overall political situation being a factor to the balancing of the court. This is unsound
insofar as the overall political situation can hardly be determined objectively but is
subject to collective perceptions – and thus to varying public opinions. Yet courts
generally are called to protect individual rights regardless of a changing political climate
or majority opinions.
“People like us“
This case on many levels concerned the identification of individuals. The prohibition of
collective expulsion is about the required identification of individual persons. But already
the submission of an individual application to the court depends on the identification of
individuals. I have mentioned in the beginning the crucial role non-governmental
organizations and strategic litigation for such constellation to come before the ECHR and
be examined. Finally, also the perception of such case in the democratic public is about
the discerning of individuals among the migrants regularly described in numbers and
framed as masses. The case in that sense invites readers to reflect about the situation at
Europe’s external borders for which ultimately not only the Spanish but also the
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European citizenry bears responsibility. And it offers a possibility to reflect about these
regulations in that vein through the lens of an individual case and with view to concrete
persons, N.D. and N.T..
Regarding the perception of the individuals involved, Judge Dmitry Dedov’s partly
dissenting opinion offers a strange but insightful spin. His dissent concerns solely the
compensation: 5000 Euro were accorded to each of the applicants for compensation of
immaterial damage. For this estimation it obviously played a role that N.D. and N.T.
successfully entered Spain in a subsequent attempt, and were expelled from there after a
legal procedure. The damage accordingly referred not to a denied asylum procedure but
to the denial at that time, as well as to the treatment of the applicants in violation of the
Convention. Judge Dedov agrees with the majority decision in its general findings, yet
suggests that the amount of 5000 Euro is too high: recognizing the violation of the
convention would be sufficient to compensate for the immaterial damage, he argues. To
motivate this, Dedov stresses that the applicants tried violently and illegally to cross the
border. One should put oneself in the shoes of the border guards, he suggests, who are
“people like us” (sic!) and deserve respect.
The relation between this assertion and the immaterial damage of the applicants I have
difficulties to see. However, what this peculiar separate opinion shows are two things:
Firstly, how persistent the false argument “but they were acting illegally” is – despite the
principle of non-penalization in Article 31 (1) Geneva Refugee Convention, and even for a
judge who a moment prior established with the majority that no legal ways existed for
claiming asylum. And secondly, that it is worthwhile to remember from time to time, that
also the migrants, be they entitled to protection under international law or not, are
“people like us”.
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